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The role of banks in regional as well as in national economic fluc-
tuations has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years. With
what seems like amazing prescience, Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
recently revived the theoretical literature on the role of bank credit
typically associated with Brunner and Meltzer (1972). The trickle of
empirical papers written before the 1990s that focused on bank credit
turned into a torrent during the 1990s.
The primary impetus for this renewed interest was the 1990-91
recession, which seemed contemporaneously to have been distinguished
by the large, and perhaps initiating, role played by reduced bank lending.
Statements by government policymakers and the outpouring of research
on the role of bank credit in macroeconomic fluctuations over the past
five years generally indicated that banks’ capital shortfalls, whether due
to regulatory changes or loan losses, reduced bank lending and were
highly correlated with reduced output.
The strong correlation between loans and output is long-standing.
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Commerce classifies various measures
of the dollar volume of business and consumer credit outstanding as
lagging indicators of output, and it classifies various measures of the
change in business and consumer credit as leading indicators of output.
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The reasons why can be seen in Figure 1, which plots the (detrended)
monthly index of coincident indicators and real commercial bank loans
from 1959 through 1994.I Figure I shows that the cyclical components of
output and of real bank loans track each other rather closely. Between
1959 and 1994, (detrended) loans and output both turned down at or
near the NBER-dated business cycle peaks. One exception was the 1981
peak, which had not been preceded by an increase in loans. Loans also
tended to follow (with varying lags) output upward when it recovered
from its trough.2
A similar pattern held over the most recent business cycle. The
(detrended) volume of bank loans declined before the July 1990 peak
and continued to fall into the recovery that began in April 1991. In that
respect, the most recent recession was little different from its predeces-
~ The series plotted here are the residuals obtained by regressing the logarithm of the
index of each variable on a constant and a pieeewise continuous linear trend with a break
point in 1974:01. The bank loan data used are described more fully below.
2 A plot of the growth rate of loans (not shown) reveals a similar pattern. Before most
peaks, loan growth begins to slow and loan growth slows further during the ensuing
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sors. The extent to which lending fell short of its trend in 1992 and 1993
was atypical, not in its magnitude, but in how long the recovery in
lending lagged the recovery of output. Also atypical about the business
cycle that began in 1982 was how much lending rose relative to trend
during the expansion of the 1980s and how much lending then fell from
those lofty heights in the early 1990s.
RISING INTEREST IN THE DECLINING ROLE OF BANKS?
One intriguing aspect of the increased attention recently paid to
banks is that we might have expected banks to be relatively less
important in recent business cycles than ever before. Financial deregu-
lation and innovations in financial instruments and institutions might
have been expected to reduce the extent to which banks played a
"special" role in supplying either businesses or households with credit.
The removal of interest rate ceilings on bank deposits reduced the extent
of disintermediation that disrupted flows of credit and economic activity
in the past. The deepening of the commercial paper and other nonbank
markets for business loans, the widespread use of credit cards by
households and small businesses, and the explosive growth of the
secondary markets for residential mortgages and other forms of credit
presumably expanded greatly the range of relatively close substitutes for
commercial bank loans over the past few decades.
Figure 2 plots the ratio of the (dollar) volume of commercial and
industrial loans at commercial banks to the sum of those loans and the
outstanding (dollar) volume of commercial paper issued by nonfinancial
corporations. This ratio has declined steadily over the past two decades,
from about 95 percent in 1973 to 80 percent in 1993.3 This one measure
of banks’ market share indicates that banks no longer have the near-
monopoly in the market for short-term business finance that they once
did. Though banks remain the dominant suppliers of short-term busi-
ness credit, they are no longer effectively the only supplier. Measures
of banks’ share of credit extended to households (including mortgage
credit) would likely show a downward trend as well. Nonetheless,
banks s fill command a large share of the credit extended to the private
sector. How much shifts in bank lending per se have contributed to
economic fluctuations is the focus of our study.
Plan of the Paper
This paper provides estimates of the separate effects on bank
lending and on output of shifts in the demand for bank loans and of
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shifts in the supply of bank loans.4 It will also provide estimates of some
of the proximate determinants of those shocks to bank loan supply over
the 1960-94 period.
Evaluation of banks’ contributions to fluctuations in aggregate
lending and output requires distinguishing changes in bank loans that
arise from changes in the supply of bank loans from those that arise
from changes in the demand for bank loans. Identifying the separate
effects of loan supply and demand has proved to be quite difficult,s Hall
(1993), Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994), Peek and Rosengren (1994,
1995a, 1995b), and studies by many others have argued that shortfalls of
bank capital relative to some target level of capital reduced the supply of
bank loans.6 Whether the other factors that they considered reduced the
supply of bank loans, the demand for bank loans, or both, they could
not say. As a consequence, these studies could not assess the timing or
4 Throughout, unless explicitly noted otherwise, when we say loans, we refer to bank
loans.
s See Bernanke’s comments on Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and on Ramey (1993).
6 For a dissenting view, see Berger and Udell (1994).BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 87
relative importance of bank loan supply shocks in toto to bank lending
or to output.7
This study uses vector autoregressions (VARs) to assess a number
of hypotheses about the interaction of bank lending, monetary policy,
and aggregate economic activity. Evidence is presented to support the
view that applying the standard Choleski decomposition method to
VARs does a creditable job of distinguishing shocks to the supply of
bank loans from shocks to the demand for bank loans. Despite the
difficulties in measuring both the price and the non-price aspects of loan
pricing that serve to ration loan supply, we argue that shocks to the
prime interest rate seem to capture empirically the effects of shifts in
bank lending behavior that correspond to loan supply disturbances. We
then show that these shocks have had important effects on bank lending
and on aggregate output.8
Unless bank lending is affected by loan supply shocks, output will
not be. Thus, the study estimates how much effect shocks to bank loan
supply have on the outstanding (dollar) volume, or quantity, of bank
loans. It also shows what the estimates imply about the effects of bank
loan supply shocks on aggregate output. The estimates are used to
calculate the contributions of loan supply shocks to output fluctuations
over the past three decades. Though loan supply shocks are not
typically the primary determinant of recessions, we show that they
played an atypically large role in the 1990-91 recession.
Also estimated is the extent to which the estimated time series of
loan supply shocks was correlated with changes in some of the pre-
sumed determinants of bank loan supply. For example, it might be
expected that loan supply would be reduced by increases in FDIC
deposit insurance fees, in reserve requirements, in the amount of capital
banks held, in the difference between deposit interest rates ceilings and
open market rates, and so on. The estimates indicate that these factors
did affect the aggregate supply of bank loans during the 1960-94 period.
We then estimated vector autoregressions (VARs) over subsamples
to provide evidence on whether the responses to loan supply shocks
changed over time. A priori, less influence of loan supply shocks might
be expected in later periods, when more close substitutes for bank loans
were available to businesses and to households. The estimates suggest
that in recent years the effects of loan supply shocks both on loan
volume and on output were smaller than they were historically.
7 They could provide estimates of the effects of capital shortfalls on bank lending and
on output, but capital considerations presumably were only one of several potential
sources of shocks to banks’ loan supplies.
8 Here we do not explicitly address the related issue of whether monetary policy
operates through its effects on the supply of bank loans.88 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
THE DATA
The estimates reported below were based on VARs that used data
for aggregate output, inflation, the federal funds rate, the prime interest
rate, and bank loans.9 The data were monthly and covered the period
January 1959 (1959:01) through December 1994 (1994:12). Except for
interest rates, the data were seasonally adjusted.
In previous empirical investigations of the relation between bank
lending and output, and in numerous other investigations that used
aggregate data, either quarterly data were used or, if the data frequency
was monthly, the index of industrial production typically was used as a
proxy for aggregate output. We used monthly data, but avoided problems
introduced by the narrowness of industrial production as a measure of
aggregate economic activity by using (the logarithm of) the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce’s Index of Coincident Indicators (ICI). The ICI is an
average of four real series: (1) employees on nonagricultural payrolls,
(2) real personal income less transfers, (3) industrial production, and
(4) real manufacturing and trade sales. Thus, the ICI subsumes the index
of industrial production. Because the ICI is constructed so as to match
the aggregate level of economic activity, we refer to the ICI as output.
The measure of inflation, PI, is 100 times the change over the prior
12 months in the log of our measure of the consumer price index (CPI).
Starting in January 1983, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
changed its calculation of the official measure of the CPI by switching
to a rental-equivalence measure of housing costs. This change was
intended to reduce biases in the CPI associated with nominal mortgage
interest rates. To make the measure of the CPI for the period before 1983
comparable with the later data, we used as the measure of the CPI an
unofficial series calculated by the BLS for the period from January 1967
through December 1982, CPIUXINS. We used the official BLS measure
of the CPI from 1959 through 1966. In the period before 1967, nominal
mortgage interest rates were low and stable enough that the differences
between the series produced by the old and new methodologies would
likely have been small.
The monthly nominal federal funds interest rate, denoted by FYFF,
is the average of daily rates, each of which was a weighted average of
rates on trades at New York federal funds brokers. The prime rate, the
nominal interest rate on short-term business loans that banks charged to
the lowest-credit-risk customers, was denoted as FYPR. The monthly
data for FYPR are averages of daily data.1°
The data on total loans and leases at commercial banks came from
9 We used RATS4.1 to obtain all our estimates.
10 Data for the federal funds rate and the prime rate came from the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System release G.13.BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 89
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The bank loan
data were adjusted by the staff at the Federal Reserve Board for the
change in definition that took place in January 1973. We adjusted the
data for the data break due to the Federal Reserve’s changed method of
calculation that took effect in January 1988.11 Data on bank loans were
converted to real terms by dividing them by our measure of the
consumer price index. Logged, real bank loans are denoted RBL.
STRATEGY AND RESULTS
Estimates from vector autoregressions (VARs) were used to assess a
number of hypotheses about the interaction of bank lending, monetary
policy, and aggregate economic activity. Three exogenous variables
were included in each of the VARs we estimated: two trend variables
and (current and seven lagged values of) the producer price index for
crude petroleum.12 The first trend variable begins in the first period of
the sample; the second is zero until January 1974, when it takes on a
value of one. It rises by one each month thereafter. The trend terms
together are meant to allow for a once-broken linear trend in the log of
potential real GDP. Statistical tests of lag length indicated that seven lags
of each variable should be included.13 To allow for lags, the estimation
period was shortened to 1960:08 through 1994:12.
Similarities to and Differences from Earlier Findings
Because using the monthly ICI as a proxy for aggregate output is
surprisingly uncommon, we began by estimating VARs similar to those
based on quarterly data reported by Friedman and Kuttner (1993). We
find the common use of the monthly index of industrial production
in lieu of the ICI especially surprising because the index of industrial
production is one component of the ICI and the other components of
the ICI provide information about economic activity in the non-indus-
trial part of the economy, which is probably larger than the industrial
part. We were also interested in the effects of moving to higher-fre-
quency data. Friedman and Kuttner used real GDP as a proxy for output
11 To do so, we multiplied the data for the period before January 1988 by 0.9955.
12 The PPI was deflated by our measure of consumer prices to make it a relative price
and then was logged.
13 Based on DeJong, Nankervis, Savin, and Whiteman’s (1992) test for the null of trend
stationarity, we could reject the null only for the real loan series (test statistic of 0.26
compared to a 5 percent critical value of 0.24). Using the first difference of RBL in place of
the level had no substantive effects on our results. The residuals from the VAR passed
standard tests for stationarity and showed no signs of serial correlation. Based on a
likelihood ratio test, the null of six lags versus the alternative of seven lags could be
rejected easily; seven lags could not be rejected against the alternative of eight lags. We
used seven lags throughout.90 Carl E. Walsh and ]ames A. Wilcox
Figure 3
RESPONSES TO A FUNDS RATE SHOCK
a. Output Effects
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and the change in the implicit deflator for GDP as their measure of
inflation, neither of which is available at a monthly frequency. Their
sample period was 1960:QII through 1992:QIV, which is quite similar to
ours. They reported impulse-response functions from four-variable
VARs that included, in order, real GDP, inflation, and the federal funds
rate, as well as one additional variable from among a set of various
financial market variables. Each of their VARs included four lags of each
endogenous variable.
Figure 3 shows our estimates of the responses of output, inflation,
the funds rate itself, and (the quantity of real) bank loans to a one-BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 91
standard-deviation shock to the federal funds rate; also shown for the
impulse-response functions are the one-standard-error bands, which
were obtained by Monte Carlo integration.~4 The VAR specified the
endogenous variables in the following order: ICI, PI, FYFF, and RBL.~5
This specification was chosen because of its similarity to the Friedman
and Kuttner specification.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that, in response to a positive shock to
the funds rate, output first briefly rose by a small and statistically
insignificant amount. It then declined rather sharply, troughed about 20
months after the funds rate shock, and rebounded to its pre-shock level
about three and one-half years after the shock. Thus, we found a pattern
based on monthly data with ICI used as a proxy for output that was
broadly consistent with estimates based on quarterly data with real GDP
used as a measure of output.16 Panel (a) shows that output troughed at
about a 0.17 percent decline relativo to baseline, whereas Friedman and
Kuttner reported a maximum decline of about three times that amount,
which seems consistent since they used quarterly rather than monthly
data. Bernanke and Mihov (1995), using a monthly GDP series, found
a somewhat larger effect for a funds rate increase.17 As expected, the
response of inflation, plotted in Panel (b), trailed and was generally
smaller than the response of output to a funds rate shock.18
After a short, sharp, significant increase in response to an upward
shock to the funds rate, bank lending moved below baseline and stayed
there for about two years, as shown in panel (d). 19 We attribute the rise
in lending that immediately followed a monetary contraction to the
increased credit needs of firms that find cash flows declining in the face
of reduced aggregate demand.2°
The esfimates in Figure 3 also differ in noteworthy ways from those
obtained by Friedman and Kuttner. For example, we found that output
both declined and rebounded more rapidly; this difference could result
solely from their use of quarterly average rather than monthly data. In
contrast to the results in panel (d), Friedman and Kuttner estimated that
14 Standard error bands were generated based on 1,000 draws.
15 We omitted FYPR from the VARs used to generate Figure 3.
16 Bernanke and Mihov (1995) find a similar response using a monthly GDP measure.
17 Note that over the 1960--94 period the variance of detrended (log) quarterly real
GDP was smaller (3.85 percent) than that of the detrended (log) monthly index of
coincident indicators (4.34 percent).
18 Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the "price puzzle," that inflation initially rises in
response to a funds rate shock. Though it has been argued that including a commodity
price variable in a VAR tends to eliminate the puzzle, our specifying the real price of
petroleum as exogenous did not eliminate it. The positive responses of output and inflation
were small enough that the one-standard-error bands always contained the baseline.
19 This is similar to the pattern reported by Bernanke and Blinder (1992):
2o For example, Wilcox (1992) reports that while commercial and industrial loans
initially rise in response to a funds rate shock, consumer and real estate loans decline.92 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
a funds rate shock raised bank lending above baseline for three years;
this is difficult to reconcile with our a priori belief that an increase in the
funds rate represented a tightening of monetary policy.21 To the extent
funds rate shocks~ approximated shifts in monetary policy, the estimates
delivered by our specification seemed more plausible.
In principle, the demand for bank loans may have shifted impor-
tantly, for example, because of substantial changes in the supply of
nonbank finance. A priori, we did not expect loan demand shocks to be
important determinants of changes in the volume of bank loans or of
changes in output. In that regard, we concurred with Bernanke and
Blinder’s (1988) view that, in contrast to shocks to loan supply, it might
be "difficult to think of or identify major shocks to credit demand, that
is, sharp increases or decreases in the demand for loans at given interest
rates and GNP/’ The evidence presented below supports that view.
To help judge whether shocks to the real quantity of bank loans
were important, Figure 4 shows the estimated responses to them. Panel
(a) shows that output rose briefly but by only a very small amount in
response to a positive shock to loan volume. The ensuing responses of
output to the loan quantity shock were always small and insignificant.
This contrasts with the Friedman and Kuttner finding that, in response
to a loan volume shock, output rose continually over a three-year
period. Inflation also responded by small and insignificant amounts to
loan quantity shocks. The funds rates’ response being noticeably above
baseline during the first year following the positive shock to bank loans,
shown in panel (c), presumably reflected a countercyclical reaction on
the part of the Federal Reserve.
Figure 5 shows impulse-response functions obtained when we
substituted the prime interest rate for the volume of bank loans in the
four-variable VAR. A prime rate shock was estimated to lower output
and inflation initially. As in Figure 3, the inflation response trailed that
of output. These responses are consistent with a prime rate shock being
identified as a loan supply shock. But they contrast with the Friedman
and Kuttner finding that shocks to the bank loan interest rate, which
they measured as a spread over the commercial paper rate, led to a rise
in output.
Figure 5 also shows that a positive prime rate shock was followed
by a decline in the federal funds rate, again presumably reflecting a
countercyclical policy response of monetary policy by the Fed. Since
output reversed its decline and eventually rose temporarily above the
baseline path, the policy response appeared to overcompensate for the
prime rate shock. Though the typical response of the funds rate can
21 This judgment is perhaps more accurately term our "posterior" belief, since it has
been influenced by the evidence presented in a number of earlier studies.BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 93
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hardly be blamed for being "too late," it might be judged to be "too
much."
Identifying Loan Supply and Loan Demand
Above, we have demonstrated that the responses reported in
Figures 4 and 5, and our interpretation of shocks to loan quantity and to
the prime rate as loan demand and supply shocks, respectively, are
robust to having included only one of the two variables from the bank
loan market at a time. Next we report estimates of a VAR that included94 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
Figure 5
RESPONSES TO A PRIME RATE SHOCK
a. Output Effects
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both the prime rate and the real quantity of bank loans. The effects on
output, inflation, the funds rate, the prime rate and bank lending of
shocks to the two loan market variables are shown in Figures 6 and 7. In
calculating these impulse-response functions, we ordered the variables
as: ICI, PI, FYFF, FYPR and RBL, respectively. Reversing the ordering of
the two loan market variables had little effect on the estimated impulse-
response functions.
If the prime rate and the real quantity of bank loans are jointly
determined in the market for bank loans, the recursive structure
imposed by a Choleski decomposition would fail to separately identifyBANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 95
supply and demand disturbances. To check this possibility, we also
experimented with the specification of a "structural VAR" in which the
prime rate and loan quantity were assumed to be simultaneously
determined, with both responding contemporaneously to both loan
supply and demand shocks. These shocks were then identified through
a priori restrictions on the contemporaneous relations among the basic
disturbances. Specifically, maintaining the recursive structure for out-
put, inflation, and the funds rate that was used in the basic VAR
formulation, we allowed the residuals in the equations for FYPR and
RBL to be linear combinations of underlying loan supply and demand
disturbances. We identified these equations by excluding the funds rate
from the loan demand equation and contemporaneous output and
inflation from the loan supply equation. In addition, we included the
credit-policy dummies developed by Romer and Romer (1993) as instru-
mental variables when we estimated the loan demand equation.
The estimated loan supply shock series obtained via the structural
VAR was highly correlated with the prime rate shock series obtained via
the Choleski decomposition. Similarly, the loan demand shock series
was highly correlated with the loan quantity shock series obtained via
the Choleski decomposition. Thus, the estimates of the shocks to loan
supply and to loan demand appeared robust to the alternative structural
VAR identification scheme. In addition, the correlation between the
structural loan supply shocks and the loan quantity shocks from the
astructural Choleski decomposition was small, and the correlation
between the structural loan demand shocks and the prime rate shock
from the astructural Choleski decomposition was small.22 These small
correlations suggest that the Choleski decomposition separated supply
from demand about as effectively as the structural VAR did. Conse-
quently, we report results below only for the Choleski decomposition.
What Were the Effects of Shocks to
Loan Supply and Loan Demand?
Figures 6 and 7 plot the responses of the five endogenous variables
to the loan quantity and prime rate shocks identified via the Choleski
decomposition. In Figure 6, panel (e) shows that loan quantity remained
above baseline for several years following an upward shock to itself.
Similarly, output tended to rise above baseline within six months of a
positive shock to loan demand and stayed above baseline for at least
22 Letting (s d) denote the estimated structural shocks and (pr I) denote the shocks
from the Choleski decomposition, correlation(s, pr) = 0.972, correlation(d, 1) = 0.937,
correlation(s, 1) = -0.171, correlation(d, pr) = 0.149.96 Carl E. Walsh and James A, Wilcox
Figure 6
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four years following the shock.23 Shocks to loan demand also generated
temporarily higher funds rates, as the Fed apparently responded coun-
tercyclically to the higher output and inflation rates. The prime rate
traced out a response path similar to that of the funds rate, presumably
both because the increased demand for bank loans allowed banks to
increase the spread they charged between the prime interest rate and
bank funding costs and because the higher funds rate raised banks’
funding costs. Each of these responses was consistent with loan quan-
tity shocks effectively measuring shocks to loan demand. Inflation
staying below baseline, however, did not support this interpretation.24
In contrast, the responses in Figure 7 to a prime rate shock were
consistent with responses to a loan supply shock. The response of the
quantity of bank loans supported the idea of an upward shock to the
prime rate being interpreted as a reduction in the supply of bank loans.
Panel (e) shows that loan quantity began to decline almost immediately
following the rise in the prime rate, fell to a level significantly below
baseline, and remained below baseline for about one and one-half years.
Output also fell in response to an increase in the prime rate, just as
would be expected if the shock to the prime rate could be associated
with a change in the supply of "special" bank loans. About one year
after the shock, output reverted to baseline and for the subsequent two
years was above baseline. In fact, in the second and third years
following the shock to the prime rate, each of the responses, including
that of the prime rate itself, was reversed. One possible explanation for
this positive effect is that the initial increase in the prime rate led to a
more-than-offsetting decline in the funds rate, as shown in Panel (c). To
the extent the Federal Reserve "overreacted" in lowering the funds rate,
it might eventually have raised the funds rate to a level higher than
baseline when bank loans, output, and inflation each moved above their
baseline levels. Also consistent with a positive shock to the prime rate
being associated with a reduction in the supply of bank loans was the
decline in the inflation rate. This decline tended to trail that of output,
as would be expected.
23 Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argued that shocks to loan demand might be relatively
small. That is different from arguing that the responses will be small. Shocks to bank loan
demand might be larger than shocks to the demand for total (bank plus nonbank) credit.
24 Because of the bank’s balance sheet identity, our use of a bank asset variable, real
loans, could actually be capturing the effects of disturbances to bank liabilities and
therefore the money stock. However, if our loan demand shock is actually a money
demand shock that, given the funds rate, leads to an expansion of reserves and the money
supply, we would expect the prime rate to decline as banks attempt to expand lending.
The estimated impulse-response functions show the prime rate rising in response to a
shock to the real quantity of bank loans, which is more consistent with our interpretation.98 Cart E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
Figure 7
RESPONSES TO A PRIME RATE SHOCK
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How Important Were Loan Shocks to
Output and to Bank Lending?
Table 1 reports the shares of the variance of the forecast error at
various horizons for output (panel a) and for bank loan quantity (panel
b) attributable to shocks to the bank loan market variables in the
five-variable VAR. The fraction of output forecast error variance attrib-
uted to orthogonalized shocks to the prime rate was much larger than
that attributed to bank loan shocks, although neither explains much of
the forecast error variance of output.25 Taken together, loan supply and
demand accounted for less than 2 percent of the variance of output at a
12-month horizon and about 5 percent at a 36-month horizon. Reversing
the order of the two loan market variables (so that FYPR entered before
RBL) had virtually no impact on the variance decompositions. Note also
that the shares of forecast error variance of lending associated with
output (about 20 percent at a horizon of two years) were considerably
larger than the shares of forecast error variance of output associated with
the bank loan variables (less than 4 percent at a horizon of two years).
Although in principle one might expect that the residuals from the
real loan quantity and prime rate equations in the VAR would be
determined simultaneously by the interaction of loan demand and loan
supply factors, they were nearly independent disturbances. The simi-
larity between the results from the four-variable systems reported in
Figures 3 and 4, each of which excluded one of the loan market
variables, and the five-variable system (which included both bank loan
market variables) suggests that prime rate shocks and real loan quantity
shocks were essentially orthogonal. That view was buttressed by the
low (0.14) correlation between the unorthogonalized residuals and by
the variance decompositions being hardly affected by the ordering of
FYPR and RBL.
Panel (b) shows that shocks to the prime rate accounted for about 5
percent of the forecast error variance of bank lending at a six-month
horizon, but typically less than half that amount at longer horizons.
Thus, loan supply shocks had effects on loan volume that were also
quite small. Forecast errors in loans themselves of course accounted for
most of the variance. Somewhat surprising was the infinitesimal share
of forecast error variance attributable to the funds rate, especially in light
of the funds rate’s contribution to the forecast error variance of output,
shown in panel (a). One reason that the funds rate may have smaller
shares here than in previous studies is that Table 1 is based, not on
industrial production as a measure of aggregate output, but on the index
of coincident indicators. Industrial production is likely to be more
25 Very similar shares emerged when the bank loan volume and prime rate variables
are included separately.100 Carl E,. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
Table 1
Variance Decompositions for Output and Bank Lending
a. Which Shocks Drove Output?
Share of Output Forecast Error Variance Attributable to:
Horizon
(months) ICl PI FYFF FYPR RBL
3 96.9 1.4 .1 1.5 .1
6 91.7 5.5 .3 2.4 .0
12 82.3 12,8 3.3 1.4 .1
18 71.6 19.2 6.9 2.0 .3
24 63.1 23.6 9.8 3.1 ,3
36 55.6 27.2 12.2 4.6 .5
48 56,1 26.6 11.9 4.7 .6
b. Which Shocks Drove Bank Lending?
Share of Bank Loan Quantity Forecast Error Variance Attributable to:
Horizon
(months) ICl PI FYFF FYPR RBL
3 6.3 8.9 2.2 2.6 80.0
6 9.6 11.6 1.6 5.1 72.2
12 15,8 18.6 1.3 3.2 61.1
18 19.1 27,4 1,5 1,7 50.1
24 19.4 34.2 1.7 1.3 43.4
36 17.1 41.3 1.5 1.8 38.4
48 15.8 42.3 1.7 2.2 38.0
heavily weighted toward output such as durable goods, demand for
which might be more interest-sensitive than the broader measure of
output for which ICI served as a proxy.
When Was the Loan Market Shocked?
Figure 8 plots the time series of orthogonalized loan market shocks
implied by the five-variable VAR. The top panel plots shocks to loan
supply (that is, to the prime rate) and the bottom panel plots shocks to
loan demand (that is, to loan quantity). Because loan supply shocks
pertained to the prime interest rate and loan demand shocks pertained
to the quantity of loans outstanding, we scaled each series by its own
estimated standard deviation to make them more comparable.
Loan supply shocks were estimated to have been unusually large
during 1980 and 1981. Indeed, the single largest negative shock was
recorded in early 1980, the time when the "Federal Reserve imposed
credit controls.26 The estimates indicated that loan supply shocks were
26 See Romer and Romer (1993).BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 101
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predominantly positive from 1985 through 1988 and predominantly
negative in 1989 and 1990, which conforms to popular accounts of banks’
lending practices during these periods. It is notable that the estimated
loan supply shocks have not been particularly large since the late 1980s.
The largest loan demand shocks occurred during 1973 and 1974, and
the shocks tended to be positive during 1988 and 1989. Loan demand
showed no particular pattern during the 1990s.102 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
How Much Did Loan Supply Shocks Affect Bank Lending?
Changes in the real volume of bank loans outstanding can be ex-
pressed as the sum of the contributions of the endogenous variables.
Figures 9A and 9B plot the historical decomposition of the effects on loan
quantity of shocks to output, to the funds rate, and to the prime rate.27
Figure 9A plots data for the entire period, while Figure 9B plots data for the
1985-94 period. The vertical lines indicate the dates of business cycle peaks.
Panel a of Figure 9A shows that shocks to output contributed much
more than the funds rate or the prime rate contributed to variations in
bank loan quantity. Changes in monetary policy, identified here with
fed funds rate shocks, also had appreciable effects on bank lending, as
shown in panel b. Panel c shows that changes in bank loan supply as
proxied by shocks to the prime rate generally were the least important
contributors to bank loan quantity.
Figure 9B shows that the relative contributions of output, the funds
rate, and the prime rate typical of the longer term were also in evidence
over the most recent decade. Even during the most recent recession,
output (panel a) contributed considerably more to the decline in loans
than did reduced supplies of bank loans, as measured by the prime rate
(panel c). Over the past decade, the contributions of monetary policy
apparently were a mirror image of those of output. Tightened monetary
policy restrained bank lending beginning in 1988, two years before the
onset of the recession in July 1990, while an eased policy contributed
ever more positively to bank lending by 1991.28
During 1989 and 1990, bank lending was greater than it would have
been otherwise because of prior increases in the supply of bank loans.
By early 1991, however, the contribution of loan supply to lending was
declining and, through 1992 and 1993, the contribution of loan supply
was negative. Figure 9B then suggests, that monetary policy reduced the
growth rate of lending before the recession began (which may have led
to a recession even without the subsequent reduction in loan supply)
and that, once the recession was under way, shocks to loan supply
aggravated the decline in lending. By the end of 1994, the contractionary
effects of loan supply on lending appeared to have been spent.
How Much Did Loan Supply Shocks Affect Output?
Figure 10 plots the contributions of shocks to bank loan supply and
demand to movements in output. Panel a plots the sum of the contri-
27 Figure 9 does not plot the historical contributions of inflation shocks or of shocks to
loan demand (quantity) itself.
28 The contribution of the funds rate is similar to that of the money supply reported
by Walsh (1993),BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 103
Figure 9A
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butions of the two loan market variables to variation in output for the
entire sample period; panel b plots the separate contributions of loan
supply and loan demand shocks to output. As already shown by the
variance decompositions, loan market disturbances generally were not
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Panel b suggests that output typically was affected more by changes
in loan supply than by changes in loan demand. But the relative
contributions of supply and demand vary a great deal from episode to
episode. For example, in the mid 1960s, positive shocks to loan demand
contributed to output being well above its deterministic level, while the
effect of loan supply was to hold back output. In contrast, in the early
1970s, both supply and demand restrained output. In the late 1980s,106 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
loan demand contributed relatively little to output, while the eased loan
supply provided considerable propulsion to output. And, finally, dur-
ing the first half of the 1990s, the contractionary contributions of loan
supply more than offset expansionary effects coming from loan demand.
By the end of 1994, neither loan supply nor loan demand was pushing
output away from its trend level.
What Shocked Bank Loan Supply?
We specified the VARs so that we could estimate the values of
shocks to bank loan supply and the effects of those shocks. Though the
estimated shocks to the prime rate shown in Figure 8 are not forecastable
on the basis of the variables used in the VARs, they may be explicable
with other variables that affect bank loan supply. For two reasons, we
want to know whether the estimated shocks to the prime rate were
correlated over the 1960-94 period with identifiable factors that would
be expected to affect bank loan supply. First, finding appreciable
correlations between the estimated prime rate shock series and factors
expected to affect loan supply supports our judgment that prime rate
shocks can be interpreted as loan supply shocks. Because our empirical
specification includes only bank loan variables and not measures of total
credit, the loan market shocks we identify could simply be proxying for
disturbances to total credit supply and demand. Evidence that the loan
supply shocks we identify are related to bank-specific factors would give
some evidence that it is bank lending disturbances that are producing the
effects on output that we estimate, and that these effects are not just
reflecting disturbances to total credit supply. Second, because the
magnitudes of some of the factors can be determined by policymakers,
knowing which factors affected loan supply, and by how much, helps
predict the effects of policies that affect banks.
Among the reasons that banks may reduce the supply of bank loans
are changes in regulations that raise bank costs. Table 2 presents the
results of regressing the estimated loan supply shock series (plotted in
Figure 8) on various measures of regulatory variables. We used a
number of the variables that Laderman (1993) suggested as candidates to
explain the competitiveness of banks in the face of nonbank competition
for short-term business loans: banks’ capital ratio, reserve requirements,
the spread between open-market interest rates and the regulatory
ceiling on savings account deposit rates, and deposit insurance premi-
ums. We also included dummy variables to allow for the imposition and
removal of credit controls in 1980.
Data limitations restricted the estimation period to quarterly dataBANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 107
from the fourth quarter of 1961 through the second quarter of 1990.29 In
columns 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variable is the (quarterly average of
the) estimated loan supply shock series (ELSQ). The dependent variable
in column 4 is the estimated loan demand shock series (ELDQ), whose
monthly values are also plotted in Figure 8. The dependent variable in
the fifth column is the first-difference of WILLING, D(WILLING), the
net percentage of banks indicating more "willingness" to make con-
sumer installment loans.30
As approximations to the shocks to the explanatory variables that
might account for shocks to loan supply, we used differences of the
Laderman (1993) data. To allow for the extra costs imposed on banks by
higher capital ratios and to allow for the seasonality of reported bank
capital, we included D4A4, the four-quarter difference in the aggregate
capital ratio of banks. To allow for changes in the implicit tax on banks
associated with zero-interest-bearing required reserves, we included
DRRR, the first difference of the ratio of required reserves not adjusted
for changes in reserve requirements to required reserves adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements.3~ We included D80Q1 and D80Q2,
dummy variables that take the value zero for each quarter except 1980:I
and 1980:II respectively, when they each take the value one, to allow for
the imposition and removal of credit controls on banks.
To allow for the increased costs associated with higher deposit
insurance fees, we included a measure of the change, PREMLED1, in
the ratio of net aggregate deposit insurance premiums to total insured
deposits, led one quarter. We specified this variable to be led one
quarter, because banks typically were given notice of upcoming changes
in deposit insurance fees. Because preliminary regressions indicated
that the first difference of PREMLED1, D(PREMLED1), was more highly
correlated with ELSQ than was PREMLED1, we included D(PREMLED1)
in the regressions reported in Table 2.
We also included the change in the difference between the levels of
the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the regulatory ceiling on savings
account deposit rates, SPREAD, to allow for the reduction in bank loan
supply attributable to disintermediation associated with open-market
rates rising above deposit rate ceilings. We set SPREAD equal to zero in
quarters when the difference between the Treasury bill rate and the
29 Because the Laderman data were available at a quarterly frequency, we took
quarterly averages of the estimated loan supply and demand series. Her data began in
1961 and ended in 1990.
3o The series comes from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of Bank Lending Practices. Because data for WILLING
begin in 1966:III, the estimation periods for regressions reported in Table 2 that included
it begin in 1966:IV. We divided WILLING by 1,000.
31 This variable did not come from Laderman (1993), who used a measure of required
reserves adjusted for the level of nominal interest rates.108 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
Table 2
Determinants of Shocks to Loan Supply
Estimation Period: 1961:1V to 1990:11 Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable
Explanatory ELSQ ELSQ ELSQ ELDQ D(WlLLING)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant .006 .007 .008 -.002 .000
(.51) (.53) (.57) (-.09) (.22)
D4A4 8.60 9.28 8.24 -9.78 .537
(1,41) (1.52) (1.18) (-.86) (~56)
DRRR .509 .605 .572 -.261 -.186
(1.62) (1.87) (1.47) (-.41) (-3.73)
D80Q1 .300 .306 ,303 -.029 -.000
(2.39) (2.44) (2.21) (-.13) (-.14)
D80Q2 -.254 -.193 -.206 -.291 -.043
(-1.98) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.15) (-2.04)
D(PREMLED1) 983 860 840 -51 -125
(2.31) (1.96) (1.72) (-.06) (-1,89)
D(SPREAD) -- .013 .012 -.004 -.004
(1.13) (.91) (-.20) (-2.40)
D(WILLING) -- -- -.228 -.740 --
(-.29) (-.59)
R2 .135 .145 .148 .029 .235
S.E.E. .125 .125 .136 .222 ,019
F 3.410 3.062 2.167 .369 4.497
Prob(F) ,007 .008 .045 .918 .001
ceiling rate was negative. Because preliminary regressions again indi-
cated that the first difference of SPREAD, D(SPREAD), was more highly
correlated with ELSQ than was SPREAD, we included D(SPREAD) in
the regressions reported in Table 2.32
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that bank loan supply shocks were
indeed larger when banks’ capital ratios increased, when required
reserves increased, when credit controls were imposed in 1980 (and
were smaller when those credit controls were removed), and when
deposit insurance fees were increased. Of these, the last three were
statistically significant. Column 2 adds D(SPREAD) to the variables
included in Column 1. Though D(SPREAD) was not statistically signif-
32 In preliminary regressions, we included both the levels and first-differences of the
changes of each of the right-hand-side variables, in order to assess which specifications
were more closely associated with shocks to loan supply.BANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 109
icant, a more tightly binding interest rate ceiling was associated with
reduced supply of bank loans. In columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2, the
impact of removing the 1980 credit controls was estimated to be roughly
the same as having imposed them. In each of the first three columns, the
F-statistic for the regression indicates a significant relation overall, as
indicated by the probabilities of obtaining F-statistics that large being
less than 5 percent.
To the extent that D(WILLING) can be interpreted as a predeter-
mined measure of the extent to which banks are willing to extend credit
to households, we expect it to negatively affect loan supply. (An
alternative interpretation is given below and discussed in connection
with the results in Column 5.) Column 3 shows that increases in
D(WILLING) only insignificantly reduced bank loan supply. In results
not shown in Table 2, we found that including the dummy variable for
credit actions developed by Romer and Romer (1993) did not add
significantly to the explanation of loan supply shocks, regardless of
whether the 1980 credit control variables were included.
Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the variables we posited would
reduce bank loan supply are significantly related to shocks to the prime
rate, which we interpret as shocks to bank loan supply. To cross-check
these results, we also regressed shocks to real bank loans, which we
interpret as shocks to bank loan demand, on the same explanatory
variables used in Column 3. Column 4 reports the results of testing the
null hypothesis that none of the determinants of supply affected bank
loan demand. Indeed, not one of the variables was significantly corre-
lated with our measure of demand. Nor was the F-statistic of 0.369
anywhere near its 0.05 critical value.
Column 5 treats D(WILLING) as a dependent variable. One inter-
pretation of willingness to lend is that it is itself a measure of bank
loan supply. As would be expected on that interpretation, willingness
to lend to households declines significantly with increases in reserve
ratios and with disintermediation due to higher values for D(SPREAD).
Weaker support emerged from the negative but insignificant effect
of higher deposit insurance fees on banks’ willingness to lend to
households.
Taken together, the columns of Table 2 suggest that positive shocks
to the prime rate are correlated with identifiable changes in regulations
and conditions that would be expected to reduce bank loan supply. At
the same time, those changes are not correlated with shocks to the
demand for loans. These results give additional support to our earlier
interpretation of the shocks from the Choleski decomposition of the
VAR residuals. And finally, banks’ self-reported willingness to lend is
correlated with the measures of changes in regulations and conditions
that would be expected to affect bank loan supply.110 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
Are Banks Now Less Important?
Because several substitutes for bank loans to businesses and con-
sumers have developed over time, we expected that shocks to bank loan
supply of a given size should have ever-larger effects on bank lending
and ever-smaller effects on output over time. Borrowers may now have
greater access to nonbank lenders (such as finance companies and the
market for commercial paper). They may also be less subject to credit
rationing by banks because of pre-arranged loan commitments and
credit card lines. Thus, a reduction in the supply of bank loans might
now lead borrowers to move more readily to nonbank sources of credit
and to sidestep credit rationing. As a consequence, a reduction in bank
loan supply might now have less effect on total (bank plus nonbank)
borrowing and thus on output than it had in the past.
Panel a of Figure 11 plots the impacts on bank loans and panel b the
impacts on output of a 50-basis-point prime rate shock. The solid line in
each panel represents the responses calculated from data for the more
recent half (1978 to 1994) of the sample. The grey line represents the
responses calculated from the data for the first half (1960 to 1977) of the
sample. In general, and in contrast to our hypothesis, the response of
bank loans to loan supply shocks was somewhat larger in the earlier
period.
Output on average was less affected by loan supply shocks in the
more recent period than in the earlier period. The initial responses of
output were actually larger in the more recent period; the change was
noticeable but probably not statistically significant. The major difference
in the response of output shows up in the second, third, and fourth
years following a loan supply shock. In contrast to the lingering and
sizable effects on output estimated for the period before the mid 1970s,
in the more recent period, the effects on output of loan supply shocks
are near zero in the third and fourth years. Thus, the changes in the
responses of loans and output are only partially consistent with the
financial deepening view of credit markets. At the same time, evidence
for the early 1990s reminds us that bank loan supply shocks can still be
important. Borrowers may have greater access to credit substitutes, but
shocks to bank loan supply still act like sand in the gears of credit and
output markets.
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that a simple VAR framework that includes the
prime rate and real bank lending appears to provide estimates of the
separate effects on bank lending and on output of shifts in the demand
for bank loans and of shifts in the supply of bank loans. The estimates
suggest that shocks to banks’ loan supply were sometimes importantBANK CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 111
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determinants of the volume of bank loans outstanding and of aggregate
output. They were particularly important over the most recent business
cycle. In that sense, banks mattered.
We provided estimates of some of the proximate determinants of
shocks to bank loan supply. Loan supply was reduced by increases
in FDIC deposit insurance fees, increases in reserve requirements,112 Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox
increases in bank capital, and the imposition of credit controls in 1980.
By their effects on bank loan supply, these factors may have consider-
able impact on output.
Although loan supply shocks typically were not the primary deter-
minant of recessions, we show that they played a larger role during the
1990-91 recession than they had in two decades. At the same time, the
response of output to loan supply shocks may have been tempered in
recent years by the development of substitutes for bank loans. In that
regard, banks may be less important than they were in the past.
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Crunch’." Manuscript, February 26.The central question at the heart of Walsh and Wilcox’s paper is:
Does monetary policy affect output through bank assets or bank liabilities?
Using aggregate data and a vector autoregression (VAR), they attempt
to estimate the quantitative importance of different channels of mone-
tary transmission. More specifically, they try to identify the impact of
bank loan demand shocks and bank loan supply shocks on output, and
to measure the relative size of their effects. The results suggest that
neither loan demand shocks nor loan supply shocks have much impact
on output.
My comments can be divided into three parts. First is a brief review
of the literature on the monetary transmission mechanism. Next, I
describe several pitfalls inherent in using aggregate data to try to
distinguish the channels of monetary transmission. Finally, I discuss the
methods and results of Walsh and Wilcox’s paper, beginning with a
description of how they identify loan supply from loan demand, and
ending with my interpretation of their results.
THEORIES OF THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
What are the views of monetary transmission, and why do we care
to distinguish them? The answer to the second part of the question is
straightforward. If bank assets (that is, loans) are important in the
transmission mechanism, then monetary policy will have important
distributional consequences that may entail efficiency losses. When
credit market imperfections and ’bank loan supply’ effects are quantita-
*Professor of Economics, The Ohio State University.114 Stephen G. Cecchetti
tively meaningful, then policy’s impact depends on the characteristics of
borrowers that are unrelated to the inherent creditworthiness of their
investment projects. As a result, an entrepreneur may be deemed
unworthy of credit simply because of a currently low net worth, for
example, regardless of the social return to the project being proposed.
As I describe in a recent survey,1 the two views of the monetary
transmission mechanism can be labeled the Money View and the
Lending View.2 In the Money View, reductions in the quantity of
outside money raise real rates of return. This, in turn, reduces invest-
ment, as fewer profitable projects are available at higher required rates
of return--this is a movement along a fixed marginal efficiency of
investment schedule.
The Lending View has two parts, commonly labeled ’broad’ and
"narrow.’ The broad lending view is based on the existence of credit
market imperfections.3 The basic idea is that information asymmetries
and moral hazard problems, as well as bankruptcy laws, imply that the
state of a firm’s balance sheet has implications for its ability to obtain
external finance. As a result, monetary policy-induced increases in
interest rates (which are both real and nominal) can cause a deterioration
in the firm’s net worth, both by reducing expected future sales and by
increasing the real value of nominally denominated debt. With lower net
worth, the firm is less creditworthy, as it has an increased incentive to
misrepresent the riskiness of potential projects. As a result, potential
lenders will increase the risk premium they require when making loans.
The asymmetry of information makes internal finance of new invest-
ment projects cheaper than external finance.
The narrow lending view is associated with bank loans. The
argument has two clear parts. First, some borrowers cannot finance new
projects except through loans. And second, policy changes have a direct
effect on loan supply, since bank loans and outside money (that is
controlled by the monetary policy authority) are complements. It is
important to emphasize that banks need not be explicitly involved, as
this could be a result of the complementarity of ’small business loans’
and outside money in investors’ portfolios. The most important impact
of a p~licy innovation is cross-sectional, as it affects the quantity of loans
to loan-dependent borrowers.
Walsh and Wilcox’s goal is to measure the relative importance of
loan supply and loan demand effects on output. They are not trying to
~ See Cecchetti (1995).
2 In his comments on an earlier paper, R. Glenn Hubbard labels the first of these by
the more accurate term, the user-cost-of-capital view.
3 Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994) have labeled this the ’financial accelerator.’DISCUSSION 115
distinguish the money view from the broad lending channel. Rather,
they are studying the size of the narrow lending channel.
PITFALLS IN TESTING WITH AGGREGATE DATA
The work in this paper focuses solely on aggregate data, utilizing
total real bank loans economy-wide. But a number of well-known
pitfalls are associated with use of such data in this context. I will discuss
three.
First, can aggregate timing relationships tell us anything about the
transmission mechanism? The fact is that credit lags output it is
countercyclical. But since individuals must continue to service credit
even after income falls, credit falls after income, regardless of whether it
is the fundamental source of fluctuations.4
Second, can forecasting power, or correlations, tell us anything?
What if credit measures contain information about output fluctuations
beyond what is already accounted for in monetary aggregates? Mone-
tary aggregates are a measure of bank liabilities, while credit aggregates
are measures of bank assets. Since these are calculated slightly differ-
ently, they will not be identical. But it is these technical measurement
differences that are likely to account for the differences in forecasting
ability, not anything about the transmission mechanism.5
Walsh and Wilcox examine a VAR with real activity, inflation, the
federal funds rate, and real bank loans. My interpretation of this is that
their bank loans measure provides information about fluctuations in
’money’ that is not included in the federal funds rate.
Finally, can we learn anything from interest rate data? Walsh and
Wilcox employ the prime rate as their measure of the price of bank loans.
The theory tells us that what we need is a measure of the change in the
marginal cost of bank funds to a constant-quality borrower. But during
recessions, banks drop lower-quality borrowers rather than raising in-
terest rates. This suggests that we really cannot observe the interest rate
we would like to see, as it is the rate on loans that are not made. It is not
the prime rate. We would be happy with observations on the secondary
market for small business loans, but these are also hard to come by.
To put the same point slightly differently, movements in the prime
rate do not give us a very good indication of the change in the
composition of bank loan portfolios. Are they making more loans under
commitment? Is higher-quality collateral being required? Beyond this
is the problem that the prime rate is an administered price, whose
See Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994).
This argument is due to Bernanke (1993).116
meaning has changed dramatically
Walsh and Wilcox study.6
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over the 30-year sample period
~DENTIFICATION ~SSUES
The heart of Walsh and Wilcox’s paper is the section on identifying
loan supply and loan demand. This is what allows them to conclude that:
[S]hocks to banks’ loan supply were sometimes important determinants
of the volume of bank loans outstanding and of aggregate output in general.
They were particularly important over the most recent business cycle. In that
sense, banks mattered.
How can we evaluate this? Overall, I believe that, even if taken at
face value, their results provide very little support for such a statement.
Their measured impact of loan demand and loan supply innovations
on output is rarely different from zero at standard levels of statistical
significance. (Keep in mind that they plot one-standard-deviation bands
on their impulse-response figures.)
But more importantly, a careful examination of Walsh and Wilcox’s
methods suggests that we should not accept their interpretation of their
results. I will provide a summary of what they do.
Their main conclusions are based on estimation of a simple VAR,
which I will write as
(1)
where A(L) is a matrix of lag polynomials in the lag operator L, y is
activity, ~ris inflation, rffis the federal funds rate, rp is the prime lending
rate, qZ is the real quantity of bank loans, ~y is the output ’shock,’ ep is the
inflation ’shock,’ %~ is the monetary ’shock’, ~s is the loan supply ’shock,’
and ~a is the loan demand ’shock.’ The error process is assumed to be
independently and identically distributed, with covariance matrix equal
to the identity matrix.7
6 In addition, as Mester and Saunders (1990) emphasize, the prime rate behaves
asymmetrically, rising more quickly than it falls.
7 It is worth making a small technical disgression here. It is standard in this literature
to use the log of the price level. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) for a
review. In addition, Walsh and Wilcox use overlapping observations of the 12-monthDISCUSSION 117
Standard methods involve estimating the reduced form of (1), and
then identifying the structural errors by calculating A(O). Walsh and
Wilcox assume that A(O) is lower triangular. This imposes a very clear
structure on the supply and demand curves. While it is rarely done in
this context, I find it instructive to actually write the equations down.
Ignoring output and inflation, as well as lags of all variables, the supply
and demand curves are
rPt = ~r~tf + ~st Supply (2)
t ft. ~dt Demand (3) qlt = alrftf + a2rp
Identification is achieved by assuming that the contemporaneous
quantity of bank loans does not appear in the supply equation. This
means that (after removing the impact of the federal funds rate)
contemporaneous loan supply is flat at the current prime interest rate!
Changes in the quantity of real loans outstanding are ascribed to loan
demand shocks. My sense is that this cannot be right. The cost of funds
to loan suppliers, that is, banks, must rise with quantity even in the very
short run.
Beyond the issue of identifying loan supply shocks from loan
demand shocks, an even more fundamental question is raised by the
Walsh and Wilcox VAR methodology. Can a VAR structured in this way
actually address the question of interest? I take the issue to be whether
monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy through bank assets or
bank liabilities. Implicitly, this question takes policy as the fundamental
disturbance to the economy, and examines its effects. Walsh and Wilcox
examine the relative importance of ~st and ~t on output. These are not
monetary policy shocks. If ~,nt is the policy shock, then ~st and ~t are
shocks to the financial system that are constructed to be uncorrelated with
policy disturbances, and so do not address the central issue.
Given this, how do I interpret their conclusions--principally the
results in their Table 1? What they show is that shocks to bank loan
supply--that by construction are unrelated to monetary policy--have virtu-
ally no impact on output. Furthermore, shocks to bank loan demand
have a small (but probably statistically insignificant) impact on the real
economy. On the other hand, monetary policy shocks explain a bit over
12 percent of the variance in output after three years. But the bulk of the
variation in output is explained by ’own’ shocks, ~,~, which may be
aggregate supply disturbances, and by shocks to prices, ~p, which might
be aggregate demand disturbances that are uncorrelated with the rest of
inflation rate and do not correct for the induced serial correlation structure in their error
process---it is an MA(ll). This affects the standard error bands on the impulse responses.118 Stephen G. Cecchetti
the shocks. This rings true, as it is not too dissimilar from results
reported by Gali, in his estimation of a structural VAR.
CONCLUSION
Let me close with the following points. It is my strongly held
opinion that financial innovation will lead us to the virtual elimination of
banks as depository institutions in the not too distant future. As a result,
to know if the impact of monetary policy is weakening, we must
understand whether something about banks is particularly important in
the monetary transmission mechanism. But to do this, we have to
separate the cross-sectional effects due to credit market imperfections
from those that are the result of banks per se. The work of Walsh and
Wilcox does not help us with this.
On the other hand, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) suggest one
possible way of distinguishing. If one can find a recessionary period that
was not preceded by a monetary contraction, and show that interest
rates rose but that bank dependence was irrelevant to individual firms’
experiences, this would mean that banks are responsible for the distri-
butional effects induced by monetary shocks. I know of no such evidence.
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Allan Ho Meltzer*
With commendable timing, academic economists rediscovered bank
lending just before the start of the 1990-91 recession. Bernanke (1983)
claimed that the shifts in loan supply made a major contribution to the
Great Depression of the early 1930s. Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
developed a small model interrelating loans, deposits, and output. I
refer to this work and the many papers that followed as "the lending
view."
THE LENDING VIEW
The lending view became an active research area just before the
Federal Reserve and the Bush Administration argued publicly that
reduced willingness of banks to lend contributed to the 1990-91 reces-
sion and the slow recovery. One metaphor of the time was that a
50-mile-an-hour head wind was blowing against the expansion. The
(intended) presumption was that the Federal Reserve was doing its
prudent utmost to foster expansion but was stymied by the refusal of
banks to lend aggressively. I argued at the time that this view was
wrong (Meltzer 1991).
The lending view consists of two principal propositions. First,
spending by some group of borrowers depends on bank loans. Second,
monetary policy shifts the supply of bank loans relative to other types
of credit.
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The first proposition is not in doubt if "depends" means only that
bank loans are a main source of external finance for many small and
medium-sized firms. Alternative lenders exist for these firms, however,
including finance companies, trade credit, credit card debt, venture
capitalists, families, and others. At issue is how much substitution
occurs among types of credit. This issue is usually neglected, and the
current paper is not an exception. Studies of bank lending and borrow-
ing cannot by themselves establish that borrowers could not or did not
obtain credit or that they were forced to contract.
The second proposition is more doubtful. The principal problem
for the lending view is to show that autonomous shifts in banks’
offers to lend contribute significantly to cyclical changes in total lending
and output. The alternative view is that bank lending responds to
demand. Critics of the lending view point out that banks can borrow
Eurodollars, issue certificates of deposit, sell securities, and in other
ways finance lending if it is profitable. And, if the banks face an excess
demand for loans, why do other intermediaries fail to satisfy the excess
demand?
THE WALSH-WILCOX ANALYSIS
The paper by Carl E. Walsh and James A. Wilcox is a serious effort
to analyze part of the second proposition. The authors try to separate
shocks to supply and shocks to demand, using the prime rate to
measure supply effects and the real value of loans to measure customers’
demand. The general idea is to treat borrowers as price takers and banks
as price setters. Banks set the prime rate and allow borrowers to decide
how much to borrow. Borrowing and lending decisions are part of a
five-equation monthly model interrelating the real amount of bank
lending, and the prime lending rate, with measures of output, inflation,
and monetary policy. The monthly output measure appears to be an
improvement on previous work.
The authors deserve credit for making a serious effort to show that
the demand and supply shocks they estimate are not spurious; they
obtain similar measures using alternative procedures. They can be
faulted for treating all loans as homogeneous and made at the prime
rate. This is not entirely consistent with the lending view. On that view,
small borrowers are subject to non-price rationing.
Walsh and Wilcox summarize their findings as showing: (1) supply
shocks have had "’important" effects on bank lending (p. 87); (2) the
principal supply shocks in the recent past were changes in banks’ capitalDISCUSSION 121
ratios, required reserves, and deposit insurance fees (p. 109);1 and
(although the conclusion blurs this finding) (3) output was on average
less affected by loan supply shocks in the recent cycle than in past
periods (p. 112).
PROBLEMS WITH THE ANALYSIS
Despite the authors’ careful work, I am skeptical about their find-
ings, for two main reasons. First, their model is misspecified in a way
that is important for the identification of demand and supply shocks.
Unless we are reasonably certain that we have identified demand and
supply shocks accurately, we cannot conclude reliably about relative
effects of shifts in demand and supply. Second, the model is incomplete.
The authors barely mention other intermediaries and sources of credit.
Even if we correctly identify supply effects, we cannot conclude that
loan supply affects output if we do not control for two types of
substitution. Borrowers can substitute other forms of lending for bank
lending, and bankers can substitute for reserves by borrowing in the
Eurodollar, CD, and other markets.
Let me state what is and is not at issue. First, it is not surprising that
the amount of bank lending changes with the costs of bank lending.
Increases in reserve requirements, deposit insurance premiums, and
other costs reduce the size of banks relative to competitors. Borrowers
shift to lower-cost suppliers. At issue is how quickly the adjustment
occurs, whether there is full substitution, and whether part of the
adjustment occurs by banks acquiring liabilities that are not subject to
the new rules. Large CDs have not been subject to reserve requirements
since 1970, debentures are not subject to deposit insurance, and so on.
Second, I have no quarrel with the lending view when it claims that
intermediation matters. The issue is whether intermediaries can prevent
Federal Reserve policy from affecting output and prices or change the
size of those effects in the way described by the lending view. If banks
were less likely to lend in 1991 because of new capital requirements or
deposit insurance fees, why did the Federal Reserve not add more to the
supply of reserves to encourage more expansion?
Walsh and Wilcox write their model with five variables: the federal
funds rate, the prime loan rate, output, inflation, and the real value of
total commercial bank loans and leases. Bank lending is independent of
the stock of bank reserves or the monetary base, and the federal funds
rate contains all information about Federal Reserve policy. In practice,
1 Only the last two are statistically significant. Walsh and Wilcox also report effects
of the 1980 credit controls. I omit the 1980 credit controls as raising separate issues. It is
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the Federal Reserve shifts the federal funds rate and allows bank
reserves to adjust. Hence, at any preset federal funds rate, banks can
obtain (or reduce) reserves and expand (or contract) bank loans if the
return to lending is positive (negative). In other words, the federal funds
rate alone does not tell us whether bank reserves are rising or falling. An
essential part of the monetary mechanism is missing. The missing pieces
are important when the economy changes direction or speed, particu-
larly if the Federal Reserve is slow to change the funds rate. Some
measure of aggregate reserves or base money should be part of the
model to test for an independent or non-monetary lending channel.
A peculiar feature of the work on the lending view that I have seen
is that nonbank financial assets are nowhere to be found. Banks hold
both loans and securities, such as Treasury bills and government bonds.
Omitting government securities is a second misspecification.
To show why, let me describe where the misspecification enters.
Suppose a shock to bank lending has occurred, such as is discussed in
the Walsh-Wilcox paper and in the lending view generally. Banks in the
aggregate now lend less per dollar of reserves than in the past. Since
they lend less, two outcomes are possible, given the supply of reserves
or base money and the stock of government securities. Banks either hold
excess reserves or buy more securities. Since bank reserves have zero
interest return, banks minimize excess reserves. Hence, a decision to
reduce loans is a decision to buy more securities. Banks bid for securities
in an open market, so their decisions change the yield on securities
relative to other yields. Other intermediaries such as thrift institutions,
mortgage lenders, finance companies, and the like, faced with the
resulting change in relative yields, acquire an alternative asset. They
supply the loans, mortgages, or leases that the banks forgo. The net
effect is a change in the banks’ supply of loans without a corresponding
change in total credit extended. The only alternative is that banks hold
idle excess reserves. There is no evidence that this occurred in the 1990s.
If it had occurred, the solution would have been simple. The Federal
Reserve could have supplied more base money by lowering the funds
rate, as they soon did.
Let me summarize. Bank lending is not informative about whether
or not output would have expanded more in the 1991-92 period. The
authors are right to separate loan demand and supply, but their analysis
cannot answer the question: Did restrictions on bank lending reduce
output in 1991 and in 1992? No evidence in the movement of excess
reserves shows that banks refused to lend or reduced lending. Even if
they did, the banks’ actions tell us nothing about the total supply of
credit offered to business and households.
Two main reasons that bank lending fell during the early 1990s were
that the economy was in recession and bank reserves rose very slowly.
Bank reserves are the raw material for aggregate bank loans and money.DISCUSSION 123
In the two years ending with the fourth quarter of 1990, total bank
reserves rose at a 0.6 percent annual rate; total reserves increased by less
than $1 billion during the two years as a whole. In the next two years,
total reserves rose at an 11.7 percent compound annual rate, and the
addition to reserves was $18.6 billion. The funds rate was re~duced from
8 percent in the fall of 1990 to 41/4 percent in the fall of 1991. Talk about
a credit crunch and 50-mile-an-hour head winds ended. In my view, the
lending problem was in part a monetary problem and in part a problem
of anticipations set off by lower inflation and falling asset prices in many
markets--especially real estate markets. Whether judged by interest
rates or reserve growth, monetary policy was very restrictive (as the
Shadow Open Market Committee argued at the time).
Before leaving this part of my discussion, let me narrow some of the
differences with Walsh and Wilcox. My claim is that the effect of bank
lending on output, given the growth of money and government debt, is
close to zero, so I set it at zero. The authors find that 6 to 18 months after
a lending shock, bank lending explains about 2 percent of the unex-
plained variance of output.
We can further narrow the differences. Walsh and Wilcox use
monthly data from 1959 through 1994. From the mid 1960s to the end of
the 1970s, Regulation Q ceilings were binding at times. Until 1970, the
ceiling rates applied to all CDs, even the largest. The ceilings worked to
reverse the relation between growth of money and bank credit (loans
and securities). When the ceiling was binding, wealth owners reduced
time deposits and bought securities directly. Bank credit, including
loans, declined relative to money, currency, and demand deposits.
Some of these effects are hidden in the Walsh-Wilcox estimates because
they do not isolate the effects of Regulation Q and the credit crunches it
fostered. I believe that if they separated the effects of Regulation Q, their
estimate would be less biased, smaller, and closer to mine at zero.
A FINAL TEST
A main piece of evidence in favor of the lending view comes from
the Great Depression. Bank failures, corporate failures, and increased
risk make a plausible ease for the lending view in this period. If declines
in bank lending have an independent effect, the Great Depression is the
period when that effect should be most obvious.
Remember that, according to the lending view, the effect occurs
because small firms are much more dependent on banks. Small firms are
forced to curtail activity because they cannot borrow. Plausible as this
story seems, it is not supported by the data. During the Great Depres-
sion, open market borrowing in the form of commercial paper and
bankers’ acceptances declined relative to commercial bank loans (in 101
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Then as now, larger, more secure firms were the main borrowers on the
qpen market. The fall in open market borrowing relative to bank
borrowing is counter to the lending view.
None of this denies that intermediation is important. My conclusion
is that restrictive Federal Reserve policy explains the decline in both
money and bank lending during the Great Depression and in the most
recent recession. Credit crunches had an independent effect on lending
under regulation Q rules, but this is well-known and not part of the
lending view.
POSTSCRIPT
Shortly after completing this comment, I received two new studies
of bank lending and the lending view. Morris and Sellon (1995, p. 73)
write: "[C]oncern that structural changes in the banking system may
affect the transmission mechanism does not appear to be warranted."
Sharpe (1995, pp. 32-33) concludes that there is little evidence support-
ing claims that the decline in lending in the 1990-91 period was the
result of capital standards. These studies add to the growing skepticism
about the main tenets of the lending view.DISCUSSION 125
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